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Abstract
Current dynamic epistemic logics for analyzing effects of informational events often become cumbersome
and opaque when common knowledge is added for groups of agents. Still, postconditions involving common
knowledge are essential to successful multi-agent communication. We propose new systems that extend the
epistemic base languagewith a newnotion of ‘relativized commonknowledge’, in such away that the resulting
full dynamic logic of information ﬂow allows for a compositional analysis of all epistemic postconditions
via perspicuous ‘reduction axioms’. We also show how such systems can deal with factual alteration, rather
than just information change, making them cover a much wider range of realistic events. After a warm-up
stage of analyzing logics for public announcements, our main technical results are expressivity and com-
pleteness theorems for a much richer logic that we call LCC. This is a dynamic epistemic logic whose static
base is propositional dynamic logic (PDL), interpreted epistemically. This system is capable of expressing
all model-shifting operations with ﬁnite action models, while providing a compositional analysis for a wide
range of informational events. This makes LCC a serious candidate for a standard in dynamic epistemic logic,
as we illustrate by analyzing some complex communication scenarios, including sending successive emails
with both ‘cc’ and ‘bcc’ lines, and other private announcements to subgroups. Our proofs involve standard
modal techniques, combined with a new application of Kleene’s theorem on ﬁnite automata, as well as new
Ehrenfeucht games of model comparison.
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1. Introduction
Epistemic logic deals with what agents consider possible given their current information. This
includes knowledge about facts, but also higher-order information about information that other
agents have. A prime example is common knowledge. A formula ϕ is common knowledge if ev-
erybody knows ϕ, everybody knows that everybody knows that ϕ, and so on. Common belief is an
important related notion. Indeed, although this paper is mainly written in ‘knowledge’ terminology,
everything we say also holds, with minor technical modiﬁcations, when describing agents’ beliefs,
including common belief.
Dynamic epistemic logics analyze changes in both basic and higher-order information.
One of the main attractions of such systems is their transparent analysis of effects of
communicative actions in the format of an equivalence between epistemic postconditions and
preconditions. A typical example concerns knowledge of an agent after and before a public
announcement:
[ϕ]a ↔ (ϕ → a[ϕ] ).
This axiom says that after the announcement that ϕ agent a knows that  iff ϕ implies that agent
a knows that after ϕ is announced  will be true. We call such principles reduction axioms, because
the announcement operator is ‘pushed through’ the epistemic operator, in such manner that on the
right hand side the complexity of the formula in the scope of the announcement is less that the
complexity of the formula in the scope of the announcement on the left hand side. This reduction
axiom describes the interaction between the announcement operator and the epistemic operator.
If there is a reduction axiom for each logical operator in the language, such a set of axioms make
logical systems particularly straightforward. For instance, the logic of public announcements with-
out common knowledge has an easy completeness proof by way of a translation that follows the
reduction axioms. Formulas with announcements are translated to provably equivalent ones with-
out announcements, and completeness follows from the known completeness of the epistemic base
logic. Thus, the dynamic logic of the announcement operator is fully characterized by the reduction
axioms.
This is the technical way of putting things. But more importantly, reduction axioms like the one
above also reﬂect a desirable methodology: they allow for compositional analysis of the epistemic
effects of informational events. This is particularly helpful with more complex scenarios, where it
is not at all easy to describe just what agents should know, or not, after some communication has
taken place: say, a round of emails involving both public ‘cc’ and half-private ‘bcc’ lines. A dynamic
epistemic logic with a complete set of reduction axioms has an ideal ‘harmony’ between its static
and dynamic parts allowing for complete compositional analysis. So, it is worth ﬁnding such sys-
tems whenever they exist. Finally, more locally, speciﬁc reduction axioms also express interesting
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assumptions about the interplay of events and knowledge. E.g., it has often been observed that the
above one for public announcement embodies a form of ‘Perfect Recall’: the event of announce-
ment does not add or delete uncertainty lines for agents among those worlds which they consider
possible.
In this light, there is a problemwith common knowledge for groups in societies of communicating
agents. Understanding group knowledge as it is gained or lost, is at the heart of analyzing epistemic
update. But existing dynamic epistemic logics have no compositional reduction axioms for achiev-
ing common knowledge, and this infelicity has been there from the start. Now, the seminal paper
[1] does treat common knowledge per se, but not on a reductive pattern, and its completeness proof
is correspondingly messy. Indeed, reduction axioms are not available, as the logic with epistemic
updates is more expressive than the logic without them. We think this is an infelicity of design, and
our main aim in this paper is to show how compositional analysis is feasible by some judicious
language extension, restoring the proper harmony between the static and dynamic features of the
system.
In Section 2 we ﬁrst look at examples of the general kinds of information change that we are
interested in. These include public announcement, but also communication involving privacy and
partial observation, and indeed, observation of any sort of event that carries information. We al-
so include real physical actions changing the world. Before we give a system that deals with all
these phenomena, we ﬁrst look at a pilot case that illustrates many issues in a simpler setting, the
logic PAL of public announcements. Section 3 gives a new and complete set of reduction axioms
for public announcement logic with common knowledge, obtained by strengthening the base lan-
guage with an operator of relativized common knowledge, as ﬁrst proposed in [3]. Moreover, since
languages with model-shifting operators like [ϕ] are of independent logical interest, we develop
the model theory of PAL a bit further, using new game techniques for epistemic languages with
ﬁxed-point operators for common knowledge to investigate its expressive power. Section 4, the
heart of this paper, then proposes a new dynamic epistemic LCC dealing with the general case
of updating with ﬁnite structures of events, generalizing the standard reference [1] to include a
much wider range of epistemic assertions, as well as factual change. What the section demonstrates,
in particular, is that PDL (the well-known system of propositional dynamic logic), when inter-
preted epistemically, can serve as a basis for a rich and expressive logic of communication that
allows for smooth compositional analysis of common knowledge after epistemic updates. To avoid
confusion with PDL in its non-epistemic uses for analyzing actions, we will call our version here
LCC.
A general approach that reduces dynamic epistemic logic to propositional dynamic logic was
ﬁrst proposed using ﬁnite automata techniques in [18], using a variant of propositional dynamic
logic called ‘automata PDL’. The new techniques used in the present paper (cf. [11]) work directly
in epistemic PDL, using the idea behind Kleene’s Theorem for regular languages and ﬁnite auto-
mata to ﬁnd the relevant reduction axioms inductively by means of ‘program transformations’.
This analysis does not just yield the meta-theorems of completeness and decidability that we are
after. It can also be used in practice to actually compute valid axioms analyzing common knowl-
edge following speciﬁc communicative or informational events. Section 5 analyzes some of our
earlier communication types in just this fashion, obviating the need for earlier laborious calcula-
tions ‘by hand’ (cf. [27]). Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions, and indicates directions for further
research.
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The broader context for this paper are earlier systems of dynamic epistemic logic, with [26,14],
and [1] as key examples of progressively stronger systems, while [8] is a source of inspiring examples.
Reduction axioms were already used to prove completeness for dynamic epistemic logics in [14] and
[1]. Another major inﬂuence is the work of [13] on common knowledge in computational settings,
using a more general temporal-epistemic framework allowing also for global protocol information
about communicative processes. Connections between the two approaches are found, e.g., in [21].
Further references to the literature on epistemic actions and to many challenging open problems in
the general landscape of update logics can be found in [5].
Even though the main thrust of this paper may seem technical, our proposal is much more
than just a trick for smoothing completeness proofs, or for ﬁnding a new model-theoretic play-
ground. It also addresses a signiﬁcant design issue of independent interest: what is the most con-
venient and transparent epistemic language for describing information ﬂow for groups of agents
in a compositional manner? Our main logic LCC in Section 4 is meant as a serious proposal for a
standard.
2. Modelling effects of communication and change
Epistemic update logics are about the effects of general communication, and indeed, they
describe the logic of observing any kind of information-bearing event. But in practice, it is
helpful to look at more constrained scenarios. A good source of examples are basic actions
in card games. Game moves then involve looking at a card, showing a card to someone (with
or without other players looking on), exchanging cards with someone (with or without other
players looking on), and perhaps even changing the setting in more drastic ways (cf. [8]). This
is not just a frivolous move toward parlour games. One can think of ‘card events’ as a sort
of normal form for any type of informational activity—and one which has the additional vir-
tue of evoking vivid intuitions. Moreover, scenarios involving the interplay of information and
ignorance are not just logician’s puzzles for their own sake: managing the right mixtures of
information and ignorance is absolutely essential to human intelligence, and to the functioning
of civilized societies.
In this section, we list some examples involving combinations of epistemic and actual change that
we think any full-ﬂedged dynamic-epistemic logic should be able to deal with. The simplest scenario
here is public announcement of some fact P , which merely requires elimination of all worlds in the
currentmodel where P does not hold. But general communication can bemuchmore complex—just
think of whispers in a lecture theatre. This requires updates of the initial information model be-
yond mere elimination of worlds. Some updates even make the current model bigger, as alternatives
can multiply. Since, all these actions involve groups of agents, understanding both individual and
common knowledge following certain events is clearly essential.
2.1. Card showing
A simple card showing situation goes as follows. Alice, Bob, and Carol each hold one of the
cards p , q, and r. The actual deal is: Alice holds p , Bob holds q, and Carol holds r. Assuming all
players looked at their own cards, but have kept them hidden from the others, this situation is
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modelled as follows (xyz represents the situation where Alice holds x, Bob holds y , and Carol holds
z, xyz—a—x′y ′z′ represents the fact that Alice cannot distinguish xyz from x′y ′z′, and xyz∗ indicates
that xyz is the situation that actually is the case).
Now assume Alice shows her card p to the whole group. This public event eliminates all
worlds from the initial model that conﬂict with the new information. Thus, out of the six giv-
en worlds only two remain: pqr and prq. In the resulting model, Bob and Carol know all the
cards, while Alice only knows that she has p—and both these facts are common knowledge.
Now consider a ‘semi-public’ action of Alice showing her card to Bob, with Carol looking on
(Carol sees that a card is shown, but does not see which card). Here is a major new idea, due
to [1]. We ﬁrst picture the new event itself as an update model whose structure is similar to
that of epistemic models in general.
According to this picture, the card that Alice shows to Bob is card p , but for all Carol knows, it
might have been q or r. In actual fact it cannot be r, as that is the card which Carol holds and has
just inspected, but this information is not part of the update action. Note that the events depicted
cannot occur in just any world. Alice can only show card p when she actually holds p , she can show
q when she actually holds q and she can show r when she actually holds r. The latter information is
encoded in so-called preconditions, and indeed, the fundamental reason why occurrences of events
carry information for us is that we know their preconditions.
Now for the update from the preceding event. Intuitively, we want a new information model
arising from the initial one that the agents were in plus the update model containing the relevant
actions. The new worlds are then old worlds plus the most recent event attached. Moreover, our
intuitions tell us what the desired result of this update should look like, viz.
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2.2. Card inspection
Next, consider acts of observation. Suppose the three cards are dealt to Alice, Bob, and Carol,
but are still face down on the table. The following picture describes an update model for Alice’s
inspecting her own card and discovering it to be p , with the others just looking on.
And here is the related update model of Alice picking up her card and showing it to the others,
without taking a look herself.
In all these cases we have clear intuitions about what the outcomes of the updates should be, and
these underlie the technical proposals made in Section 4.
2.3. Card exchange
Next, we add a case where real physical action takes place, which is not purely informational.
Suppose in the initial situation, where Alice holds p , Bob holds q, and Carol holds r, Alice and Bob
exchange cards, without showing the cards to Carol. To model this, we need an update that also
changes the state of the world. For that, we need to change the valuation for atomic facts. This may
be done by using ‘substitutions’ which reset the truth values of those atomic statements that are
affected by the action.
Note that the diagram now indicates both the earlier preconditions for events or actions, and post-
conditions for their successful execution. Here, is the result of applying this update model in the
initial situation, where all players have looked at their cards and the actual deal is pqr.
So far, we have looked at card examples, where actions are meant to be communicative, with
some intentional agent. But it is important to realize that dynamic epistemic logic can also serve as
a system for analyzing arbitrary observations of events that carry some information to observers,
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whether intended or not. That is, it is a logic of perception as much as of communication, and it is
useful for modelling the essence of what goes on in very common everyday actions. We conclude
with two illustrations in the latter mode.
2.4. Opening a window
The precondition for opening a window is that the window is closed. To make this into an update
that can always be performed, we specify different actions depending on the state of the window.
If it is open, nothing needs to be done; if it is closed, then open it. This much is standard dynamic
logic, as used in describing transition systems in computer science. But nowwe are in a setting where
agentsmay have different ‘epistemic access’ towhat is taking place. E.g., assuming the relevant event
is invisible to all (Alice, Bob, and Carol), it can be modelled as follows.
Again, we see both pre- and postconditions, with the latter depending on the former. Note that this
action can make agents ‘out of touch with reality’, perhaps through laziness in observation. Such
a mismatch can also result from being actively misled. If the window is opened in secret, its update
model looks as follows (o denotes an open window; o →  is the substitution making o true).
Further variations on this update model are possible. E.g., the window is in fact opened, while
everyone is told that it was already open. Here is the corresponding update.
2.5. Fiddling with a light switch
Fiddling with a light switch is an update that depends on the actual situation as follows: if the
light is on, then switch it off, if it is off, then switch it on. If this ﬁddling is done in a way such that
the result is visible to all, then here is its update model.
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If the ﬁddling (and its result) are kept secret, the corresponding update model looks like the above
opening, but now with the new substitution.
2.6. Remark: two limitations
The preceding examples suggest that we can view an update model with several event as a dis-
junction of instructions under conditions, i.e., as a kind of structured program ‘if the window is
open then do A or if the window is ajar, then do B, or, if the window is wide open, then do C . . ..’
This suggests a set-up where update models are built from simple actions by means of the regular
operations of choice, sequence and iteration—and perhaps even concurrent composition of events.
We will not pursue this approach here. Indeed, natural though it is, it transcends the boundaries of
our analysis. E.g., Miller and Moss [23] show that just adding ﬁnite iteration ∗ of announcements
already leads to an undecidable dynamic logic, not effectively reducible to its decidable base.
Another boundary that we will not cross is the atomic form of our postconditions for world-
changing actions. In more general scenarios, captured by logics with operators in the spirit of ‘See
To It That ϕ’, one may want to deﬁne some action as having some complex epistemic effect de-
scribed by arbitrary ϕ, such as ‘make sure that only courageous people know the true state of
affairs’. Modeling complex postconditions raises some delicate technical issues, orthogonal to our
main concerns here.
3. Logics of public announcement
Many of the issues we want to deal with in the full-ﬂedged logic of epistemic updates are also
present in the logic of the simplest form of communicative action: public announcement logic. The
corresponding update idea that announcing a proposition ϕ removes all worlds where ϕ does not
hold goes back far into the mists of logical folklore, and it has been stated explicitly since the 1970s
by Stalnaker, Heim, and others. The same idea also served as a high-light in the work on epistemic
logic in computer science (cf. [13]). Its ﬁrst implementation as a dynamic-epistemic logic seems due
to Plaza [26].
Section 3.1 is a brief introduction to public announcement logic (PAL) as usually stated. In Sec-
tion 3.2 we give a new base logic of relativized common knowledge, EL-RC. This extension was ﬁrst
proposed in [3], which analyzed updates as a kind of relativization operator onmodels. Restricted or
‘bounded’ versions of logical operators like quantiﬁers ormodalities are very common in semantics,
and we will provide further motivation below. The resulting epistemic logic with relativized com-
mon knowledge is expressive enough to allow a reduction axiom for common knowledge. A proof
system is deﬁned in Section 3.3, and shown to be complete in Section 3.4. The system is extended
with reduction axioms for public announcements in Section 3.5. The existence of reduction axioms
for public announcements and relativized common knowledge suggests that this new logic is more
expressive than the epistemic logics with public announcements proposed elsewhere in the litera-
ture. Hence, it is interesting to investigate the expressive power of this new logic with characteristic
model comparison games. These games are provided in Section 3.6. This technique is then used to
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investigate the expressive power of relativized common knowledge in Section 3.7, settling all issues
of system comparison in this area. Finally, complexity issues are brieﬂy discussed in Section 3.8.
Once again, our systemswork for agents’ beliefs aswell as knowledge inmore constrainedmodels.
In our informal explanations, we will use either notion, as seems best for getting points across.
3.1. Language and semantics of PAL
A public announcement is an epistemic event where all agents are told simultaneously and trans-
parently that a certain formula holds right now. This is modeled by amodal operator [ϕ]. A formula
of the form [ϕ] is read as ‘ holds after the announcement of ϕ’. If we also add an operator CBϕ
to express that ϕ is common knowledge among agents B, we get public announcement logic with
common knowledge (PAL − C). The languagesLPAL andLPAL−C are interpreted in standardmodels
for epistemic logic.
Deﬁnition 1 (Epistemic models). Let a ﬁnite set of propositional variables P and a ﬁnite set of agents
N be given. An epistemic model is a triple M = (W ,R, V ) such that
• W = ∅ is a set of possible worlds.
• R : N → ℘(W × W) assigns an accessibility relation R(a) to each agent a .
• V : P → ℘(W) assigns a set of worlds to each propositional variable.
In epistemic logic the relationsR(a) are usually equivalence relations. In this paper, we treat the gen-
eral modal case without such constraints—making ‘knowledge’ more like belief, as observed earlier.
But our results also apply to the special modal S5-case of equivalence relations. The semantics are
deﬁned with respect to models with a distinguished ‘actual world’: M ,w.
Deﬁnition 2 (Semantics of PAL and PAL-C). Let a model M ,w with M = (W ,R, V ) be given. Let
a ∈ N , B ⊆ N , and ϕ, ∈ LPAL. For atomic propositions, negations, and conjunctions we take the
usual deﬁnition. The deﬁnitions for the other operators run as follows:
M ,w |= aϕ iff M , v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, V ) ∈ R(a)
M ,w |= [ϕ] iff M ,w |= ϕ implies M |ϕ,w |=  
M ,w |= CBϕ iff M , v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, V ) ∈ R(B)+,
where R(B) =⋃a∈B R(a), and R(B)+ is its transitive closure. The updated modelM |ϕ = (W ′,R′, V ′)
is deﬁned by restricting M to those worlds where ϕ holds. Let
[[ϕ]] = {v ∈ W |M , v |= ϕ}.
Now W ′ = [[ϕ]], R′(a) = R(a) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]), and V ′(p) = V(p) ∩ [[ϕ]].
Here, mostly for convenience, we chose to deﬁne common knowledge as a transitive closure, as in
[13]. In [22], common knowledge is deﬁned as the reﬂexive transitive closure. Our results will work
either way, with minimal adaptations.
A completeness proof for public announcement logic without an operator for common knowl-
edge (PAL) is straightforward.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Proof system for PAL). The proof system for PAL is that for multi-modal S5 epistemic
logic plus the following reduction axioms:
Atoms  [ϕ]p ↔ (ϕ → p)
Partial functionality  [ϕ]¬ ↔ (ϕ → ¬[ϕ] )
Distribution  [ϕ]( ∧ ) ↔ ([ϕ] ∧ [ϕ])
Knowledge announcement  [ϕ]a ↔ (ϕ → a[ϕ] 
as well as the following rules of inference:
(Announcement generalization) From   , infer  [ϕ] .
The formulas on the left of these equivalences are of the form [ϕ] . In Atoms the announcement
operator no longer occurs on the right-hand side. In the other reduction axioms formulas within
the scope of an announcement are of higher complexity on the left than on the right. Note that the
Distribution axiom is the well known K-axiom from modal logic. When applied successively, these
axioms turn every formula of the dynamic language into an equivalent static one, thus showing the
earlier ‘harmony’ between the static and dynamic parts of the total system.
This system allows for compositional analysis of the epistemic effects of statements made in
groups of agents. In this light, even the technical reduction to the static part has a more general
thrust worth pointing out. What it says is that knowing the current knowledge of agents in some
models sufﬁces, in principle, for knowing the effects of nay announcement actions that could occur.
Thus, in the terminology of [6], the static language is rich enough to pre-encode all dynamic effects.
This is a powerful idea which also occurs in conditional logic, and in reasoning with conditional
probabilities. Oneway of understanding our next topic is as amove towards achieving pre-encoding
for common knowledge, too. Here is why this requires work. For public announcement logic with
a common knowledge operator (PAL-C), a completeness proof via reduction axioms is impossible.
There is no such axiom for formulas of the form [ϕ]CB , given the results in [1].
3.2. Relativized common knowledge: EL-RC
Even so, the semantic intuitions for achieving common knowledge by announcement are clear.
If ϕ is true in the old model, then every B-path in the new model ends in a  world. This means
that in the old model every B-path that consists exclusively of ϕ-worlds ends in a [ϕ] world. To
facilitate this, we introduce a new operator CB(ϕ, ), which expresses that
every B-path which consists exclusively of ϕ-worlds ends in a  world.
We call this notion relativized common knowledge. A natural language paraphrase might be ‘if ϕ is
announced it becomes common knowledge among B that was the case before the announcement.’
A shorter paraphrase of CB(ϕ, ) that we will use henceforth is ‘ is ϕ-relative common knowledge
among group B.’ Henceforth we consider only such ϕ-relative or ϕ-conditional common knowledge
of agents, just as one does in logics of doxastic conditionals, where A ⇒ B means something like
“if I were to learn that A, I would believe that B.” Yet another helpful analogy may be with the
well-known ‘Until’ of temporal logic. A temporal sentence ‘ϕ until ’ is true iff there is some point in
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the future where  holds and ϕ is true up to that point. All these readings show that the new notion
has some concrete intuition behind it. Its other virtue, as we shall see presently, is mathematical
elegance.
Deﬁnition 4 (Language and semantics of EL-RC). The language of EL-RC is that of EL, together
with the operator for relativized common knowledge, with semantics given by
M ,w |= CB(ϕ, )
iff
M , v |=  for all v such that (w, V ) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]))+,
where (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]))+ is the transitive closure of R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]).
Note that ϕ-relative common knowledge is not what results from a public update with ϕ. E.g.,
[p]CB♦a¬p is not equivalent to CB(p ,♦a¬p), for [p]CB♦a¬p is always false, and CB(p ,♦a¬p) holds
in models where every B path through p worlds ends in a world with an a successor with ¬p In
Section 3.7 we will show that CB(p ,♦a¬p) cannot be expressed in PAL − C.
The semantics of the other operators is standard. Ordinary common knowledge can be deﬁned
with the new notion: CBϕ ≡ CB(,ϕ).
3.3. Proof system for EL-RC
Relativized common knowledge still resembles common knowledge, and so we need just a slight
adaptation of the usual axioms.
Deﬁnition 5 (Proof system for EL − RC). The proof system for EL − RC has these axioms:
Tautologies All instantiations of propositional tautologies
 Distribution  a(ϕ →  ) → (aϕ → a )
C Distribution  CB(ϕ, → ) → (CB(ϕ, ) → CB(ϕ,))
Mix  CB(ϕ, ) ↔ EB(ϕ → ( ∧ CB(ϕ, )))
Induction  (EB(ϕ →  ) ∧ CB(ϕ, → EB(ϕ →  ))) → CB(ϕ, )
and the following rules of inference:
(Modus Ponens) From  ϕ and  ϕ →  infer   .
( Necessitation) From  ϕ infer  aϕ.
(C Necessitation) From  ϕ infer  CB( ,ϕ).
In the Mix and the Induction axiom, the notation EBϕ is an abbreviation of
∧
a∈Baϕ (everybody
believes, or knows, ϕ).
These axioms are all sound on the intended interpretation. In particular, understanding the va-
lidity of the relativized versions Mix and Induction provides the main idea of our analysis.
Next, a proof consists of a sequence of formulas such that each is either an instance of an axiom,
or it can be obtained from formulas that appear earlier in the sequence by applying a rule. If there
is a proof of ϕ, we write  ϕ.
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Remark It may also be helpful to write CB(ϕ, ) as a sentence in propositional dynamic logic
PDL: [(⋃a∈B a; ?ϕ)+] . Our proof system essentially follows the usual PDL-axioms for this
formula. This technical observation is the key to our more general system LCC in Section 4
below.
3.4. Completeness for EL-RC
To prove completeness for our extended static language EL − RC, we follow [16], [13]. The ar-
gument is standard, and our main new point is just that the usual proof in the literature actually
yields information about a richer language than is commonly realized.
For a start, we take maximally consistent sets with respect to ﬁnite fragments of the language
that form a canonical model for that fragment. In particular, for any given formula ϕ we work
with a ﬁnite fragment called the closure of ϕ. This is the appropriate analogue of the Fisher-Ladner
closure from the PDL literature (see [16]).
Deﬁnition 6 (Closure). The closure of ϕ is the minimal set  such that
(1) ϕ ∈ ,
(2)  is closed under taking subformulas,
(3) If  ∈  and  is not a negation, then ¬ ∈ ,
(4) If CB( ,) ∈ , then a( → ( ∧ CB( ,))) ∈  for all a ∈ B.
Deﬁnition 7 (Canonical model). The canonical model Mϕ for ϕ is the triple (Wϕ,Rϕ, Vϕ) where
• Wϕ = { ⊆  |  is maximally consistent in };
• (,) ∈ Rϕ(a) iff  ∈  for all  with a ∈ ;• Vϕ(p) = { | p ∈ }.
Next, we show that a formula in such a ﬁnite set is true in the canonical model where that set is
taken to be a world, and vice versa.
Lemma 8 (Truth lemma). For all  ∈ , ∈  iff Mϕ, |=  .
Proof. By induction on  . The cases for propositional variables, negations, conjunction, and in-
dividual epistemic operators are straightforward. Therefore we focus on the case for relativized
common knowledge.
From left to right. Suppose CB( ,) ∈ . If there is no  such that (,) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (Wϕ ×
[[ ]]))+, then (Mϕ,) |= CB( ,) holds trivially.
Otherwise, take a ∈ Wϕ such that (,) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (Wϕ × [[ ]]))+.Wehave to show that |= ,
but we show something stronger, namely that  |=  and CB( ,) ∈ . This is done by induction
on the length of the path from to. The base case is a path of length 1. Fromour assumption it fol-
lows that  ∈ . Our assumption that CB( ,) ∈  implies that  	 → a( → ( ∧ CB( ,)))
by the Mix axiom. The formula  is also in. Therefore  ∈ . By applying the induction hypoth-
esis we get (Mϕ,) |= . We already assumed that CB( ,) ∈ , therefore also CB( ,) ∈ . So
we are done with the base case.
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Now suppose that the path to  is of length n+ 1. There must be a path from  of length n
to a 
 in (R(B) ∩ (Wϕ × [[ ]]))+ such that (
,) ∈ R(a) for some a ∈ N and (Mϕ,) |=  . By the
induction hypothesis CB( ,) ∈ 
. Now we can apply the same reasoning as in the base case to
conclude that (Mϕ,) |=  and CB( ,) ∈ .
From right to left. Suppose (Mϕ,) |= CB( ,). Now consider the set :
 = {	|(,) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (Wϕ × [[ ]]))+}.
Let 	 =∨∈ 	 We have to show that
 	 → EB( → 	). (1)
Observe that if is empty, then it follows trivially, because an empty disjunction is equivalent to a
contradiction.
Otherwise note that for every a ∈ B, for every  ∈  and every ′ ∈  (where  is the comple-
ment of ) either  ∈ ′, or there is a formula ϕ′ such that aϕ′ ∈  and ϕ′ ∈ ′. From
this it follows in both cases that
 	 → EB( → ¬	)
It can also be shown that  	 ∨ 	, and therefore we get (1). By necessitation we get
 CB( , 	 → EB( → 	)).
By applying the induction axiom we can deduce
 EB( → 	) → CB( , 	).
Given that  	 → , we get
 EB( → 	) → CB( ,).
It is also the case that  	 → EB( → 	). Therefore CB( ,) ∈ . 
The completeness theorem follows in a straightforward way from this lemma.
Theorem 9 (Completeness for EL-RC). |= ϕ iff  ϕ.
Proof. Let  ϕ, i.e., ¬ϕ is consistent. One easily ﬁnds a maximally consistent set  in the closure
of ¬ϕ with ¬ϕ ∈ , as only ﬁnitely many formulas matter. By the Truth lemma, M¬ϕ, |= ¬ϕ, i.e.,
M¬ϕ, |= ϕ.
The soundness of the proof system can easily be shown by induction on the length of proofs, and
we do not provide its straightforward details here. 
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3.5. Reduction axioms for PAL–RC
Next, let PAL–RC be the dynamic epistemic logic with both relativized common knowledge and
public announcements. Its semantics combines those for PAL and EL–RC. We want to ﬁnd a re-
duction axiom for [ϕ]CB( ,), the formula that expresses that after public announcement of ϕ,
every  path leads to a  world. Note that [ϕ]CB( ,) holds exactly in those worlds where every
ϕ ∧ [ϕ] path ends in a world where [ϕ] is true. This observation yields the following proof system
for PAL–RC.
Deﬁnition 10 (Proof system for PAL–RC). The proof system for PAL–RC is that for PAL–RC plus
the reduction axioms for PAL, together with C-Red
[ϕ]CB( ,) ↔ (ϕ → CB(ϕ ∧ [ϕ] , [ϕ])) (common knowledge reduction)
as well as an inference rule of necessitation for all announcement modalities.
It turns out that PAL–RC is no more expressive than EL-RC by a direct translation, where the
translation clause for [ϕ]CB( ,) relies on the above insight:
Deﬁnition 11 (Translation from PAL–RC to EL–RC). The function t takes a formula from the lan-
guage of PAL–RC and yields a formula in the language of EL–RC.
t(p) = p
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧  ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t( )
t(aϕ) = at(ϕ)
t(CB(ϕ, )) = CB(t(ϕ), t( ))
t([ϕ]p) = t(ϕ) → p
t([ϕ]¬ ) = t(ϕ) → ¬t([ϕ] )
t([ϕ]( ∧ )) = t([ϕ] ) ∧ t([ϕ])
t([ϕ]a ) = t(ϕ) → at([ϕ] )
t([ϕ]CB( ,)) = CB(t(ϕ) ∧ t([ϕ] ), t([ϕ]))
t([ϕ][ ]) = t([ϕ]t([ ])).
The translation induced by these principles can be formulated as an inside-out procedure,
replacing innermost dynamic operators ﬁrst. To see that it terminates, we can deﬁne a notion
of complexity on formulas such that the complexity of the formulas is smaller on the right
hand side. We have added the ﬁnal axiom here for its independent interest, even though it is
not strictly necessary for this procedure. As observed in [4], it describes the effect of sequen-
tial composition of announcements, something which can also be stated as an independently
valid law of public announcement saying that the effect of ﬁrst announcing ϕ and then  is
the same as announcing one single assertion, viz. the conjunction ϕ ∧ [ϕ] . Standard program-
ming styles for performing the reduction (cf. [9]) do include the ﬁnal clause in any case. As to
its admissibility, note that, when the last clause is called, the innermost application will yield
a formula of lesser complexity. The following theorems can be proved by induction on this
complexity measure.
Theorem 12 (Translation correctness). For each dynamic-epistemic formula ϕ of PAL–RC and each
semantic model M ,w
M ,w |= ϕ iff M ,w |= t(ϕ).
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Theorem 13 (‘PAL–RC = EL–RC’).The languages PAL–RC and EL–RC have equal expressive power.
Theorem 14 (Completeness for PAL–RC). |= ϕ iff  ϕ.
Proof. The proof system for EL–RC is complete (Theorem 9), and every formula in LPALRC is
provably equivalent to its translation in LELRC, given the reduction axioms. 
3.6. Model comparison games for EL–RC
The notion of relativized common knowledge is of independent interest, just as irreducibly bi-
nary general quantiﬁers (such as Most A are B) lead to natural completions of logics with only
unary quantiﬁers. It is important to investigate the relation between the logic of epistemic logic
with relativized common knowledge with public announcement logic with common knowledge.
We provide some more information through characteristic games. Model comparison games for
languages with individual modalities are well-known, but dealing with common knowledge: i.e.,
arbitrary ﬁnite iterations, requires some nice twists. These games will be used in the next section to
investigate the expressivity of EL–RC relative to PAL–C.
Deﬁnition 15 (The EL–RC game). Let two epistemic models M = (W ,R, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,R′, V ′)
be given. Starting from each w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′, the n-round EL–RC game between Spoiler and
Duplicator is given as follows. If n = 0 Spoiler wins if w and w′ differ in their atomic properties,
otherwise Duplicator wins. Otherwise Spoiler can initiate one of the following two scenarios in each
round:
a-move Spoiler chooses a point x in one model which is an a-successor of the current w or w′.
Duplicator responds with a matching successor y in the other model. The output is x, y .
RCB-move Spoiler chooses a B-path x0 · · · xk in either of the models with x0 the current w or w′.
Duplicator responds with a B-path y0 · · · ym in the other model, with y0 = w′. Then Spoiler can
(a) make the end points xk , ym the output of this round, or (b) he can choose a world yi (with
i > 0) onDuplicator’s path, andDuplicator must respond by choosing amatching world xj (with
j > 0) on Spoilers path, and xj , yi becomes the output.
The game continues with the new output states. If these differ in their atomic properties, Spoiler
wins—otherwise, a player loses whenever he cannot perform a move while it is his turn. If Spoiler
has not won after all n rounds, Duplicator wins the whole game.
Deﬁnition 16 (Modal Depth). The modal depth of a formula is deﬁned by:
d(⊥) = d(p) = 1
d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ)
d(ϕ ∧  ) = max(d(ϕ), d( ))
d(aϕ) = d(ϕ)+ 1
d(CB(ϕ, )) = max(d(ϕ), d( ))+ 1.
If two models M ,w and M ′,w′ have the same theory up to depth n, we write M ,w ≡n M ′,w′.
The following result holds for all logical languages that we use in this paper. Recall that our stock
of propositional letters is ﬁnite.
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Lemma 17 (Propositional ﬁniteness). For every n, up to modal depth n, there are only ﬁnitely logically
non-equivalent propositions.
Theorem 18 (Adequacy of the EL-RC game). Duplicator has a winning strategy for the n-round game
from M ,w,M ′,w′ iff M ,w ≡n M ′,w′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The base case is obvious, and all inductive cases are also
standard in modal logic, except that for relativized common knowledge. As usual, perspicuity is
increased somewhat by using the dual existential modality CˆB(ϕ, ). From left to right the proof is
straightforward.
From right to left. Suppose that M ,w ≡n+1 M ′,w′. A winning strategy for Duplicator in the
(n+ 1)-round game can be described as follows. If Spoiler makes an opening move of type [a-
move], then the usual modal argument works. Next, suppose that Spoiler opens with a ﬁnite
sequence in one of the models: say M , without loss of generality. By the Lemma 17, we know
that there is only a ﬁnite number of complete descriptions of points up to logical depth n, and
each point s in the sequence satisﬁes one of these: say (s, n). In particular, the end point v
satisﬁes (v, n). Let (n) be the disjunction of all formulas (s, n) occurring on the path. Then,
the initial world w satisﬁes the following formula of modal depth n+ 1: CˆB((n),(v, n)). By
our assumption, we also have M ′,w′ |= CˆB((n),(v, n)). But any sequence witnessing this by
the truth deﬁnition is a response that Duplicator can use for her winning strategy. Whatever
Spoiler does in the rest of this round, Duplicator always has a matching point that is n-equiv-
alent in the language. 
Thus, games for LELRC are straightforward But it is also of interest to look at the lan-
guage LPALC. Here, the shift modality [ϕ] passing to deﬁnable submodels requires a new type
of move, not found in ordinary Ehrenfeucht games, where players can decide to change the cur-
rent model. The following description of what happens is ‘modular’: a model changing move
can be added to model comparison games for ordinary epistemic logic (perhaps with common
knowledge), or for our EL–RC game. By way of explanation: we let Spoiler propose a model
shift. Players ﬁrst discuss the ‘quality’ of that shift, and Duplicator can win if it is deﬁcient;
otherwise, the shift really takes place, and play continues within the new models. This involves
a somewhat unusual sequential composition of games, but perhaps one of independent interest.
Deﬁnition 19 (The PAL–C game). Let the setting be the same as for the n-round game in Deﬁnition
15. Now Spoiler can initiate one of the following scenario’s each round
a-move Spoiler chooses a point x in one model which is an a-successor of the current w or w′, and
Duplicator responds with a matching successor y in the other model. The output of this move is
x, y .
CB-move Spoiler chooses a point x in one model which is reachable by a B-path from w or w′, and
Duplicator responds by choosing a matching world y in the other model. The output of this
move is x, y .
[ϕ]-move Spoiler chooses a number r < n, and sets S ⊆ W and S ′ ⊆ W ′, with the current w ∈ S and
likewise w′ ∈ S ′. Stage 1: Duplicator chooses states s in S ∪ S ′, s in S ∪ S ′ (where S is the comple-
ment of S). Then Spoiler and Duplicator play the r-round game for these worlds. If Duplicator
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wins this subgame, she wins the n-round game. Stage 2: Otherwise, the game continues in the
relativized models M |S ,w and M ′|S ′,w′ over n− r rounds.
The deﬁnition of depth is extended to formulas [ϕ] as d([ϕ] ) = d(ϕ)+ d( ).
Theorem 20 (Adequacy of the PAL-RC game).Duplicator has a winning strategy for the n-round game
on M ,w and M ′,w′ iff M ,w ≡n M ′,w′ in LPALRC.
Proof. We only discuss the inductive case demonstrating the match between announcement modal-
ities and model-changing steps. From left to right, the proof is straightforward.
From right to left. Suppose that M ,w and M ′,w′ are equivalent up to modal depth n+ 1. We
need to show that Duplicator has a winning strategy. Consider any opening choice of S , S ′ and
r < n+ 1 made by Spoiler. Case 1:Suppose there are two points s, s that are equivalent up to depth
r. By the induction hypothesis, this is the case if and only if Duplicator has a winning strategy
for the r-round game starting from these worlds and so has a winning strategy in Stage 1. Case
2:Duplicator has no such winning strategy, which means that Spoiler has one—or equivalently by
the inductive hypothesis, every pair s, s is distinguished by some formula ϕss of depth at most r
which is true in s and false in s Observe that 	s =∧s∈S∪S ′ ϕss is true in s and false in S ∪ S ′. Note
that there can be inﬁnitely many worlds involved in the comparison, but ﬁnitely many different
formulas will sufﬁce by the Lemma 17, which also holds for this extended language. Further, the
formula S =∨s∈S 	s is true in S and false in S ∪ S ′. A formula S ′ is found likewise, and we let
 be S ′ ∨S . It is easy to see that  is of depth r and deﬁnes S in M and S ′ in M ′. Now we use
the given language equivalence between M ,w and M ′,w′ with respect to all depth (n+ 1)-formu-
las 〈〉 where  runs over all formulas of depth (n+ 1)− r. We can conclude that M |,w and
M ′|,w′ are equivalent up to depth (n+ 1)− r, and henceDuplicator has a winning strategy for the
remaining game, by the inductive hypothesis. So in this case Duplicator has a winning strategy in
Stage 2. 
In the next section we will use this game to show that EL–RC is more expressive than PAL–C. For
now, we will give an example of how this game can be played.
Deﬁnition 21. Let the model M(n) = (W ,R, V ) be deﬁned by
• W = {x ∈  | 0 ≤ x ≤ n}.
• R = {(x, x − 1) | 1 ≤ x ≤ n}.
• V(p) = W .
These models are simply lines of worlds. They can all be seen as submodels of the entire line
of natural numbers (where W = ). The idea is that Spoiler cannot distinguish two of these
models if the line is long enough. The only hope that Spoiler has is to force one of the cur-
rent worlds to an endpoint and the other not to be an endpoint. In that case Spoiler can make
a -move in the world that is not an endpoint and Duplicator is stuck. This will not succeed
if the lines are long enough. Note that a C-move does not help Spoiler. Also a [ϕ]-move will
not help Spoiler. Such a move will shorten the lines, but that will cost as many rounds as it
shortens them, so Spoiler still loses if they are long enough. The following Lemma captures this
idea.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the proof of Lemma 22.
Lemma 22. For all m, n, and all x ≤ m and y ≤ n Duplicator has a winning for the PAL–C game for
M(m), x, and M(n), y with at most min(x, y) rounds.
Proof. If x = y , the proof is trivial. We proceed by induction on the number of rounds. Suppose
the number of rounds is 0. Then x and y only have to agree on propositional variables. They must
agree, since p is true everywhere.
Suppose that the number of rounds is k + 1 (i.e. min(x, y) = k + 1). Duplicator’s strategy is the
following. If Spoiler chooses to play a-move, he moves to x − 1 (or to y − 1). Duplicator responds
by choosing y − 1 (or x − 1). Duplicator has a winning strategy for the resulting subgame by the
induction hypothesis.
Suppose Spoiler chooses to play a C-move. If Spoiler chooses a z < min(x, y), then Duplicator
also chooses z. Otherwise, Duplicator takes just one step (the minimum she is required to do).
Duplicator has a winning strategy for the resulting subgame by the induction hypothesis.
Suppose Spoiler chooses to play a [ϕ]-move. Spoiler chooses a number of rounds r and some S
and S ′. Observe that for all z < min(x, y) it must be the case that z ∈ S iff z ∈ S ′. Otherwise, Dupli-
cator has a winning strategy by the induction hypothesis by choosing z and z. Moreover for all z ≥ r
it must be the case that z ∈ S ∪ S ′. Otherwise, Duplicator has a winning strategy by the induction
hypothesis for min(x, y) and z. In Stage 2 the resulting subgame will be for two models bisimilar to
models to which the induction hypothesis applies. The number of rounds will be (k + 1)− r, and
the lines will be at least min(x, y)− r long (and (min(x, y) = k + 1). This is sketched in Fig. 1. 
3.7. Expressivity results
In this section, we investigate the expressive power of the logics under consideration here. Reduc-
tion axioms and the accompanying translation tell us that two logics have equal expressive power.
But our inability to ﬁnd a compositional translation from one logic to another does not imply
that those logics have different expressive power. Here, are some known facts. Epistemic logic with
common knowledge is more expressive than epistemic logic without common knowledge. In [1]
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Fig. 2. Expressive power of static and dynamic epistemic logics.
it was shown that public announcement logic with common knowledge is more expressive than
epistemic logic with common knowledge. This can also be shown using the results on PDL in [15].
In this section, we show that relativized common knowledge logic is more expressive than public
announcement logic with common knowledge. The landscape of expressive power is summarized
in Fig. 2. All arrows are strict.
In general one logic L is more expressive than another logic L′ (L′ −→ L in Fig. 2) if there is a
formula in the language of L which is not equivalent to any formula in the language of L′ (and every
formula in the language of L′ is equivalent to some formula in the language of L). So, in order to
show that EL − RC is more expressive than PAL–C we need to ﬁnd a formula in LELRC which is
not equivalent to any formula in LPALC. The formula
C(p ,¬p)
ﬁts this purpose. This will be shown in Theorem 27.
We can show that this formula cannot be expressed inLPALC by using model comparison games.
We will show that for any number of rounds there are two models such that Duplicator has a win-
ning strategy for the model comparison game, but C(p ,¬p) is true in one of these models and
false in the other.
In Deﬁnition 25, we provide the models that EL–RC can distinguish, but PAL–C cannot. Since,
the model comparison game for PAL–C contains the [ϕ]-move, we also need to prove that the rele-
vant submodels cannot be distinguished by PAL–C. We deal with these submodels ﬁrst in the next
deﬁnition and lemma.
Deﬁnition 23. Let the model M(m, n) = (W ,R, V ), where 0 < n ≤ m be deﬁned by
• W = {sx | 0 ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {tx | n ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {u}.
• R = {(sx, sx−1) | 1 ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {(tx, tx−1) | n+ 1 ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {(w, u) | w ∈ W \ {u}} ∪ {(u, sm), (u, tm)}.
• V(p) = W \ {u}.
The picture below represents M(2, 1).
J. van Benthem et al. / Information and Computation 204 (2006) 1620–1662 1639
Let us call these models ‘hourglasses’. The idea is that Spoiler cannot distinguish the top line
from the bottom line of these models if they are long enough. Note that apart from u this model
consists of two lines. So if Spoiler plays -moves on these lines, Duplicator’s strategy is the same
as for the line models described above. If he moves to u, Duplicator also moves to u, and surely
Duplicator cannot lose the subsequent game in that case. In these models, a C-move is very bad
for Spoiler, since all worlds are connected by the reﬂexive transitive closure of R. A [ϕ]-move will
either yield two lines which are too long, or it will be a smaller hourglass model, which will still be
too large, since the [ϕ]-move reduces the number of available moves. The Lemma below captures
this idea.
In what follows, wx is a variable ranging over sx and tx . And if tx does not exist it refers
to sx .
Lemma 24. For all m, n and all x ≤ m and y ≤ m Duplicator has a winning strategy for the public
announcement game for M(m, n),wx and M(m, n),wy with at most min(x, y)− n rounds.
Proof. We prove the case when wx = sx and wy = ty (the other cases are completely analogous) by
induction. Suppose the number of rounds is 0. Then sx and ty only have to agree on propositional
variables. They do agree, since p is true in both.
Suppose that the number of rounds is k + 1. Duplicator’s winning strategy is the following. If
Spoiler chooses to play a -move, he moves to sx−1 (or to ty−1), or to u. In the last case Duplicator
responds by also choosing u, and has a winning strategy for the resulting subgame. Otherwise Du-
plicator moves to the ty−1 (or sx−1). Duplicator has a winning strategy for the resulting subgame by
the inductive hypothesis.
Suppose Spoiler plays a C-move. If Spoiler moves to w, then Duplicator moves to the same w,
and has a winning strategy for the resulting subgame.
Suppose Spoiler chooses to play a [ϕ]-move Spoiler chooses a number of rounds r and some
S . Since, there is only one model, Spoiler only chooses one subset of W . Moreover for all z ≥
min(x, y)− n− r it must be the case that wz ∈ S . Otherwise, Duplicator has a winning strategy by
the induction hypothesis for sx and wz . In Stage 2, the result will be two models bisimilar to models
to which the inductive hypothesis applies, or to which Lemma 22 applies. 
Lastly consider the following class of models.
Deﬁnition 25. Let the model M+(m, n) = (W ,R, V ), where 0 < n ≤ m be deﬁned by
• W = {sx | n ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {tx | 0 ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {v, u}.
• R = {(sx, sx−1) | n+ 1 ≤ x ≤ m} ∪ {(tx, tx−1) | 1 ≤ x ≤ m}∪
{(w, u) | w ∈ W \ {v, u}} ∪ {(t0, v)} ∪ {(u, sm), (u, tm)}.• V(p) = W \ {u}.
The picture below represents M+(2, 0).
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In these ‘hourglasses with an appendage’, the idea is that Duplicator cannot distinguish the top
line from the bottom line of these models when they are long enough. Apart from v, the model
is just like a hourglass. So the only new option for Spoiler is to force one of the current worlds
to v, and the other to another world. Then Spoiler chooses a -move and takes a step from the
non-v world and Duplicator is stuck at v. However, if the model is large enough v is too far away.
Again a C-move does not help Spoiler, because it can be matched exactly by Duplicator. Reducing
the model with a [ϕ]-move will yield either a hourglass (with or without an appendage) or two
lines, for which Spoiler does not have a winning strategy. This idea leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 26. For all m, n and all x ≤ m and y ≤ m Duplicator has a winning strategy for
the public announcement game for M+(m, n),wx and M+(m, n), wy with at most min(x, y)− n
rounds.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 24. 
This Lemma now yields to the following theorem.
Theorem 27. EL–RC is more expressive than PAL–C.
Proof. Suppose PAL–C is just as expressive as EL–RC. Then there is a formula ϕ ∈ LPALC with ϕ ≡
C(p ,¬p). Suppose d(ϕ) = n. In that case, we would have M+(n, 0), sn |= ϕ and M+(n, 0), tn |= ϕ,
contradicting Lemma 26. Hence, EL − RC is more expressive. 
3.8. Complexity results
Update logics are about processes that manipulate information, and hence they raise natural
questions of complexity, as a counterpoint to the expressive power of communication and observa-
tion scenarios. In particular, all of the usual complexity questions concerning a logical system make
sense. Model checking asks where a given formula is true in a model, and this is obviously crucial
to computing updates. Satisﬁability testing asks when a given formula has a model, which corre-
sponds to consistency of conversational scenarios in our dynamic epistemic setting. Or, stating the
issue in terms of validity: when will a given epistemic update always produce some global speciﬁed
effect? Finally, just as in basic modal logic, there is a non-trivial issue of model comparison:when do
two given models satisfy the same formulas in our language, i.e., when are two group information
states ‘the same’ for our purposes? As usual, this is related with checking for bisimulation, or in a
more ﬁnely-grained version, the existence of winning strategies for Duplicator in the above model
comparison games.
Now technically, the translation of Deﬁnition 11 combined with known algorithms for model
checking, satisﬁability, validity, or model comparison for epistemic logic yield similar algorithms
for public announcement logic. But, in a worst case, the length of the translation of a formula is
exponential in the length of the formula. E.g., the translation of ϕ occurs three times in that of
[ϕ]CB( ,). Therefore, a direct complexity analysis is worth-while. We provide two results plus
some references.
Lemma 28. Deciding whether a ﬁnite model M ,w satisﬁes ϕ ∈ LELRC is computable in polynomial
time in the length of ϕ and the size of M.
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Proof. The argument is an easy adaptation of the usual proof for PDL or common knowledge with
common knowledge: see [16, p.202] and [13, p.91]. 
This algorithm does not sufﬁce for the case with public announcements. The truth values of ϕ and 
in the given model do not ﬁx that of [ϕ] . We must also know the value of in the model restricted
to ϕ worlds.
Lemma 29. Deciding whether a ﬁnite model M ,w satisﬁes ϕ ∈ LPALRC is computable in polynomial
time in the length of ϕ and the size of M.
Proof. Again there are at most |ϕ | subformulas of ϕ. Now we make a binary tree of these for-
mulas which splits with formulas of the form [ ]. On the left subtree all subformulas of  
occur, on the right all those of . This tree can be constructed in time O(|ϕ |). Labeling the
model is done by processing this tree from bottom to top from left to right. The only new case
is when we encounter a formula [ ]. In that case we have already processed the left subtree
for  . Now we ﬁrst label those worlds where  does not hold as worlds where [ ] holds,
then we process the right subtree under [ ] where we restrict the model to worlds labeled as
 -worlds. After this process we label those worlds that were labeled with  as worlds where
[ ] holds and the remaining as worlds where it does not hold. We can see by induction on
formula complexity that this algorithm is correct.
Also by induction on ϕ, this algorithm takes time O(|ϕ | ×‖M‖2). The only difﬁcult step is
labeling the model with [ ]. By the induction hypothesis, restricting the model to  takes
time O(| | ×‖M‖2). We simply remove (temporarily) all worlds labelled ¬ϕ and all arrows
pointing to such worlds. Again by the induction hypothesis, checking  in this new model
takes O(| | ×‖M‖2) steps. The rest of the process takes ‖M‖ steps. So, this step takes over-
all time O(| [ ] | ×‖M‖2). 
Moving on from model checking, the satisﬁability and the validity problem of epistemic log-
ic with common knowledge are both known to be EXPTIME-complete. In fact, this is true
for almost any logic that contains a transitive closure modality. Satisﬁability and validity for
PDL are also EXPTIME-complete. Now there is a linear time translation of the language
of EL–RC to that of PDL. Therefore the satisﬁability and validity problems for EL–RC
are also EXPTIME-complete. For PAL–RC and even PAL–C, however, the complexity of
satisﬁability and validity is not settled by this. Lutz [20] shows that satisﬁability in PAL is
PSPACE-complete, using a polynomial-time translation from dynamic-epistemic to purely ep-
istemic formulas. The latter is unlike the translation underpinning our reduction axioms, in
that it is not meaning-preserving. The same method probably extends to PAL–C and
PAL–RC.
Finally, the complexity of model comparison for ﬁnite models is the same as that for ordi-
nary epistemic logic, viz. PTIME. The reason is that even basic modal equivalence on ﬁnite models
implies the existence of a bisimulation, while all our extended languages are bisimulation-
invariant.
This completes our in-depth analysis of a redesigned dynamic logic of public announcement.
Having shown the interest of such a system, we now consider more powerful versions, covering a
much wider range of phenomena.
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4. A new logic of communication and change
The examples in the Section 2 set a high ambition level for a dynamic epistemic logic updating
with events involving both communication and actual change. As we explained, systems of this
general sort were proposed in [1,2], but without reduction axioms for common knowledge. We
now proceed to a version which can deal with common knowledge, generalizing the compositional
methodology for epistemic logic with announcements of Section 3.
In Section 4.1, we introduce update models and specify their execution on epistemic models in
terms of ‘product update’. The only difference with the references above is our addition of fact-
changing actions by substitutions. In Section 4.2, we review propositional dynamic logic (PDL)
under its epistemic/doxastic interpretation, written henceforth as E − PDL. In Section 4.3, we then
present our dynamic epistemic logic of communication and change LCC as an extension of E − PDL
with dynamic modalities for update models. In Section 4.4, we show that LCC is in harmony with
EPDL through a semantic analysis of epistemic postconditions, and in Section 4.5 we present a
proof system for LCC in terms of reduction axioms based on this insight [11,10].
From a technical perspective, the proofs to follow are not just simple generalizations of those
for public announcements. In [18] a correspondence between update models and ﬁnite automata is
used to obtain reduction axioms in a dynamic epistemic logic based on so-called ‘automata PDL’,
a variant of E–PDL. Our main new idea here is that this can be stream-lined by analyzing the auto-
mata inductively inside E–PDL itself [11], using the well-known proof of Kleene’s theorem, stating
that languages generated by nondeterministic ﬁnite automata are regular [17]. Themain theorems to
followuse an inductive ‘program transformation’ approach to epistemic updateswhose structure re-
sembles that of Kleene’s translation from ﬁnite automata to regular expressions. This technique for
deriving compositional reduction axiomsmay be of independent interest beyond the present setting.
4.1. Update models and their execution
When viewed by themselves, communicative or other information-bearing scenarios are similar
to static epistemic models, in that they involve a space of possible events and agents’ abilities to
distinguish between these. In [1] this observation is used as the engine for general update of epistemic
models under epistemic actions. In particular, individual events come with preconditions holding
only at those worlds where they can occur.
Of course, events normally do not just signal information, they also change the world in more
concrete ways. Before describing the update mechanism, we enrich our dynamic models with post-
conditions for events that really change the world. For this purpose we use ‘substitutions’ that effect
changes in valuations at given worlds, serving as postconditions for events to occur.
Deﬁnition 30 (Substitutions). L substitutions are functions of type L → L that distribute over all
language constructs, and that map all but a ﬁnite number of basic propositions to themselves. L
substitutions can be represented as sets of bindings
{p1 → ϕ1, . . . , pn → ϕn},
where all the pi are different. If  is a L substitution, then the set {p ∈ P | (p) /= p} is called its do-
main, notation dom(). Use  for the identity substitution. Let SUBL be the set of allL substitutions.
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Deﬁnition 31 (Epistemic models under a substitution). If M = (W , V ,R) is an epistemic model and
 is a L substitution (for an appropriate epistemic language L), then V M is the valuation given
by p · [[(p)]]M . In other words, V M assigns to w the set of worlds w in which (p) is true. For
M = (W , V ,R), call M the model given by (W , V M ,R).
Deﬁnition 32 (Update models). An update model for a ﬁnite set of agents N with a language L is a
quadruple U = (E, R, pre, sub) where
• E = {e0, . . . , en−1} is a ﬁnite non-empty set of events,
• R : N → ℘(E2) assigns an accessibility relation R(a) to each agent a ∈ N .
• pre : E → L assigns a precondition to each event,
• sub : E → SUBL assigns a L substitution to each event.
A pair U, e is an update model with a distinguished actual event e ∈ E.
In these deﬁnitions, L can be any language that can be interpreted in the models of Deﬁnition
1. Note that an ‘action model’ in the sense of [1] is a special update model in our sense, where sub
assigns the identity substitution  to every event. Our substitutions then take the original action
model philosophy one step further. In particular, our notion of update execution will reset both
basic features of information models: epistemic accessibility relations, but also the propositional
valuation. Section 4.3 then presents a dynamic logic for communication and real change based on
these general update models.
Remark: information change and real change. Note that theworld-changing feature ismodular here.
Readers only interested in epistemic information ﬂow can think of models in the original dynamic
epistemic style. All of our major results hold in this special case, and proofs proceed by merely
skipping base steps or inductive steps involving the substitutions.
Executing an update is now modeled by the following product construction.
Deﬁnition 33 (Update execution). Given a static epistemic modelM = (W ,R, V ), a world w ∈ W , an
update model U = (E, R, pre, sub) and an action state e ∈ E with M ,w |= pre(e), we say that the
result of executing U, e in M ,w is the model M ◦ U, (w, e) = (W ′,R′, V ′), (w, e) where
• W ′ = {(v, f) | M , v |= pre(f)},
• R′(a) = {((v, f), (u, g)) | (v, u) ∈ R(a) and (f, g) ∈ R(a)},
• V ′(p) = {(v, f) | M , v |= sub(f)(p)}
Once again, Deﬁnitions 32 (with all substitutions set equal to ) and 33 provide a semantics for the
logic of epistemic actions LEA of [1]. The basic epistemic language LLEA can then be extended with
dynamic modalities [U, e]ϕ, where a U is any ﬁnite update model for LLEA. These say that ‘every
execution of U, e yields a model where ϕ holds’:
M ,w |= [U, e]ϕ iff M ,w |= pre(e) implies that M ◦ U, (w, e) |= ϕ.
In [1] an axiomatic system for LEA is presented with a, somewhat complicated, completeness proof,
without reduction axioms for common knowledge. Our analysis to follow will improve on this.
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To see what is needed, observe that, again, the semantic intuition about the crucial caseM ,w |=
[U, e]CBϕ is clear. It says that, if there is a B-path w0, . . . ,wn (with w0 = w) in the static model and
a matching B-path e0, . . . , en (with e0 = e) in the update model with M ,wi |= pre(ei) for all i ≤ n,
thenM ,wn |= ϕ. To express all this in the initial static model, it turns out to be convenient to choose
a representation of complex epistemic assertions that meshes well with update models.
Now, the relevant ﬁnite paths in static models involve strings of agent accessibility steps and tests
on formulas. And these ﬁnite traces of actions and tests are precisely the sort of structure whose
study led to the design of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Initially, PDL was designed for the
analysis of programs. In what follows, however, we will give it an epistemic interpretation.
4.2. Epistemic PDL
The language of propositional dynamic logic and all further information about its semantics and
proof theory may be found in [16], which also has references to the history of this calculus, and its
original motivations in computer science. We brieﬂy recall some major notions and results.
Deﬁnition 34 (PDL, language). Let a set of propositional variables P and a set of relational atoms
N be given, with p ranging over P and a over N . The language of PDL is given by:
ϕ ::=  | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | []ϕ
 ::= a |?ϕ | 1;2 | 1 ∪ 2 | ∗.
We employ the usual abbreviations: ⊥ is shorthand for ¬, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is shorthand for ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2),
ϕ1 → ϕ2 is shorthand for ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 is shorthand for (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1), and 〈〉ϕ is
shorthand for ¬[]¬ϕ.
Deﬁnition 35 (PDL, semantics). The semantics of PDL over P ,N is given in models M = (W ,R, V )
for signature P ,N . Formulas of PDL are interpreted as subsets of W , relational atoms a as binary
relations on W (with the interpretation of relational atoms a given as R(a)), as follows:
[[]]M = W
[[p]]M = V(p)
[[¬ϕ]]M = W \ [[ϕ]]M
[[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]]M = [[ϕ1]]M ∩ [[ϕ2]]M
[[ []ϕ]]M = {w ∈ W | ∀v if (w, V ) ∈ [[]]M then v ∈ [[ϕ]]M }
[[a]]M = R(a)
[[?ϕ]]M = {(w,w) ∈ W × W | w ∈ [[ϕ]]M }
[[1;2]]M = [[1]]M ◦ [[2]]M
[[1 ∪ 2]]M = [[1]]M ∪ [[2]]M
[[∗]]M = ([[]]M)∗.
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Here ([[]]M)∗ is the reﬂexive transitive closure of binary relation [[]]M . If w ∈ W then we use
M ,w |= ϕ for w ∈ [[ϕ]]M , and we say that ϕ is true at w. A PDL formula ϕ is true in a model if it
holds at every state in that model.
These deﬁnitions specify how formulas ofPDL can be used tomake assertions aboutPDL models.
E.g., the formula 〈a〉 says that the current state has an R(a)-successor. Truth of 〈a〉 in a model
says that R(a) is serial.
Note that ? is an operation for mapping formulas to programs. Programs of the form ?ϕ are
called tests ; they are interpreted as the identity relation, restricted to the states s satisfying the
formula ϕ.
If  = {p1 → ϕ1, . . . , pn → ϕn} is a PDL substitution, we use ϕ for (ϕ) and  for (). We can








(1;2) = 1 ;2
(1 ∪ 2) = 1 ∪ 2
(∗) = ()∗.
The following holds by simultaneous induction on the structure of formulas and programs.
Lemma 36 (Substitution). For all PDL models M , all PDL formulas , all PDL programs , all PDL
substitutions  :
M ,w |= ϕ iff M ,w |= ϕ.
(w,w′) ∈ [[]]M iff (w,w′) ∈ [[]]M .
This is just the beginning of a more general model-theory for PDL, which is bisimulation-based just
like basic modal logic.
One striking feature of PDL is that its set of validities is decidable, with a perspicuous axiomat-
ization. We display it here, just to ﬁx thoughts—but no details will be used in what follows.
Theorem 37. The following axioms and inference rules are complete for PDL :
(K)  [](ϕ →  ) → ([]ϕ → [] )
(test)  [?ϕ1]ϕ2 ↔ (ϕ1 → ϕ2)
(sequence)  [1;2]ϕ ↔ [1][2]ϕ
(choice)  [1 ∪ 2]ϕ ↔ [1]ϕ ∧ [2]ϕ
(mix)  [∗]ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ [][∗]ϕ
(induction)  (ϕ ∧ [∗](ϕ → []ϕ)) → [∗]ϕ
and the following rules of inference:
(Modus ponens) From  ϕ1 and  ϕ1 → ϕ2, infer  ϕ2.
(Modal Generalisation) From  ϕ, infer  []ϕ.
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In the rest of this paper, we are going to use PDL for a very special purpose, viz. as a rich epistemic
language. This may be confusing at ﬁrst sight, since the objects in our update models are events,
and hence one might naturally think of a propositional dynamic logic for sequences of these. The
latter use would be close to describing operational structure on update models viewed as programs,
which we noted in Section 2, but then decided to forego. We ask the reader to ﬁrmly resist this
association henceforth, and focus instead on the following epistemic perspective ([24,28]). To make
the distinction even clearer, we will often refer to propositional dynamic logic in this epistemic guise
as E–PDL.
Atomic relations will be epistemic accessibilities of single agents. Compositions like b1; b2 then
express the ‘levels of knowledge’ of Parikh: if ϕ expresses that b1 wants b2 to pick up the children,
then [b1; b2]ϕ states that b1 knows that b2 knowswhat is expected of him (a precondition for being at
ease about the arrangement). Next, if B ⊆ N and B is ﬁnite, we use B as shorthand for b1 ∪ b2 ∪ · · ·.
Under this convention, the general knowledge operator EBϕ takes the shape [B]ϕ, while the com-
mon knowledge operator CBϕ appears as [B∗]ϕ, i.e., [B]ϕ expresses that it is general knowledge
among agents B that ϕ, and [B∗]ϕ expresses that it is common knowledge among agents B that ϕ.
In the special case where B = ∅, B turns out equivalent to ?⊥, the program that always fails. In
the same vein, common belief among agents B that ϕ can be expressed as [B;B∗]ϕ. But E–PDL
is much richer than these notions, in that it also allows for much more complex combinations of
agent accessibility relations, corresponding to some pretty baroque ‘generalized agents’. We have
found no practical use for these at present, but they are the price that we cheerfully pay for hav-
ing a language living in expressive harmony with its dynamic superstructure—as will be described
now.
4.3. LCC, a dynamic logic of communication and change
Now we have all the ingredients for the deﬁnition of the logic of communication and
change.
Deﬁnition 38 (LCC, language). The languageLLCC is the result of adding a clause [U, e]ϕ for update
execution to the language of EPDL, where U is an update model for LLCC.
Deﬁnition 39 (LCC, semantics). The semantics [[ϕ]]M is the standard semantics of PDL, with the
meaning of [U, e]ϕ in M = (W ,R, V ) given by
[[[U, e]ϕ]]M = {w ∈ W | if M ,w |= pre(e) then (w, e) ∈ [[ϕ]]M◦U}.
We have to check that the deﬁnition of execution of update models is well behaved. The following
theorems state that it is, in the sense that it preserves epistemic model bisimulation and update
model bisimulation (the corresponding theorems for LEA are proved in [1]).
Theorem 40. For all PDL models M ,w and N , v and all formulas ϕ ∈ LLCC
If M ,w↔N , v then w ∈ [[ϕ]]M iff v ∈ [[ϕ]]N .
This theorem must be proved simultaneously with the following result.
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Theorem 41. For all PDL models M ,w and N , v, all update models U, e :
If M ,w↔N , v then M ◦ U, (w, e)↔N ◦ U, (v, a).
Proof. We prove both results simultaneously by induction on formulas ϕ and the preconditions of
the relevant update models.
• Proof of Theorem 40: the base case for propositional variables and the cases for negation, con-
junction, and program modalities is standard. The only interesting case is for formulas of the
form [U, e]ϕ. Supposew ∈ [[[U, e]ϕ]]M . Thereforew ∈ [[pre(e)]]M implies (w, e) ∈ [[ϕ]]M◦U. By the
induction hypothesis w ∈ [[pre(e)]]M iff v ∈ [[pre(e)]]N and M ◦ U, (w, e)↔N ◦ U, (v, e). Then, by
applying the induction hypothesis to M ◦ U, (w, a) and N ◦ U, (v, e), we infer v ∈ [[pre(e)]]N im-
plies (v, e) ∈ [[ϕ]]N◦U. By the semantics this is equivalent to v ∈ [[[U, e]ϕ]]N . The other way around
is completely analogous.
• Proof of Theorem 41: Let B be a bisimulation witnessingM ,w↔N , v. Then the relation C between
WM × EU and WN × EU deﬁned by
(w, e)C(v, f) iff wBv and e = f
is a bisimulation. 
The induction hypothesis guarantees that (w, e) exists iff (v, f) exists.
Suppose (w, e)C(v, f). Then wBv and e = f. The only non-trivial check is the check for sameness
of valuation. By wBv, w and v satisfy VM(w) = VN (V ). By e = f, e and f have the same substitution
. By the fact that w and v are bisimilar, by the induction hypothesis we have that w ∈ [[ϕ]]M iff
v ∈ [[ϕ]]N . Thus, by VM(w) = VN (s) and the deﬁnition of V M and V N , we get V M(w) = V N (V ).
Theorem 42. For all PDL models M ,w, all update models U1, e and U2, f :
If U1, e↔U2, f then M ◦ U1, (w, e)↔M ◦ U2, (w, f).
Proof. Let R be a bisimulation witnessing U1, e↔U2, f. Then the relation C between WM × EU1 and
WM × EU2 given by
(w, e)C(v, f) iff w = v and eRf
is a bisimulation.
Suppose (w, e)C(v, f). Thenw = v and eRf. Again, the only non-trivial check is the check for same-
ness of valuation. ByeRf, the substitutions  ofe and  of f are equivalent Byw = v, VM(w) = VM(V ).
It follows that V M(w) = V M(V ), i.e., (w, e) and (v, f) have the same valuation. 
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4.4. Expressive power of LCC
Now, if we have designed things well, the dynamic system just deﬁned should be in harmony
with its static substructure. In particular, we expect reduction axioms for compositional analysis
of the effects of arbitrary update models: [U, e][]ϕ. These will then, if one wants to phrase this
somewhat negatively, ‘reduce LCC to EPDL.’ As before, the quest for such principles starts with an
attempt to describe what is the case after the update in terms of what is the case before the update.
In case of LCC, epistemic relations can take the shape of arbitrary EPDL programs. So we must
ask ourselves how we can ﬁnd, for a given relation [[]]M◦U a corresponding relation in the original
model M ,w.
A formula of the form 〈U, ei〉〈〉ϕ is true in somemodelM ,w iff there is a -path inM ◦ U leading
from (w, ei) to a ϕworld (v, ej). Thatmeans there is some pathw · · · v inM and some path ei . . .ej in
U such that (M ,w) |= pre(ei) and (M , V ) |= pre(ej) and of course (M , V ) |= 〈U, ej〉ϕ. The program
T Uij (), to be deﬁned below, captures this. A T
U
ij ()-path in the original model corresponds to a
-path in the updated model. But in deﬁning T Uij () we cannot refer to a model M . The deﬁnition
of the transformed program T Uij () only depends on , U, ei and ej . These program transformers




[T Uij ()][U, ej]ϕ.
The remainder of this section is directed towards showing that this axiom is sound (Theorem 48).
Our main new technical contribution in this paper lies in the machinery leading up to this.
The program transformer T Uij is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 43 (T Uij program transformers).
T Uij (a) =
{
?pre(ei); a if eiR(a)ej ,
?⊥ otherwise,
T Uij (?ϕ) =
{
?(pre(ei) ∧ [U, ei]ϕ) if i = j,
?⊥ otherwise,
T Uij (1;2) =
n−1⋃
k=0
(T Uik (1); T Ukj (2)),
T Uij (1 ∪ 2) = T Uij (1) ∪ T Uij (2),
T Uij (
∗) = KUijn(),
where KUijn() is given by Deﬁnition 44.
We need the additional program transformer KUijn in order to build the paths corresponding to
the transitive closure of  in the updated model step by step, where we take more and more worlds
of the update model into account. Intuitively, KUijk () is a (transformed) program for all the  paths
from (w, ei) to (v, ej) that can be traced throughM ◦ U while avoiding a pass through intermediate
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states with events ek and higher (this is the thrust of Deﬁnition 44). Here, a  path from (w, ei) to
(v, ej) is a path of the form (w, ei), (v, ej) (in case i = j), or (w, ei) −→· · · −→(v, ej). Intermediate
states are the states at positions · · · where a  step ends and a  step starts. Note that the restriction
only applies to intermediate states. States passed in the execution of  may involve events em with
m > k . A given intermediate state er may occur more than once in a  path.
Just as the deﬁnition of T Uij () does not refer to a concrete modelM , alsoK
U
ijn() does not depend
on a concrete modelM . We only need to be concerned about the paths from ei to ej that could be
the event components in a -path in the updated model. Thus, KUij0() is a program for all the paths
from ei to ej that can be traced through U without stopovers at intermediate states that could yield
a  path in an updated model. If i = j it either is the skip action or a direct  loop, and otherwise
it is a direct T Uij () step. This explains the base case in the following notion.
Deﬁnition 44 (KUijk path transformers). K
U





? ∪ T Uij () if i = j,






∗ if i = k = j,
(KUkkk())
∗;KUkjk() if i = k /= j,
KUikk(); (KUkkk())∗ if i /= k = j,
KUijk () ∪ (KUikk(); (KUkkk())∗;KUkjk()) otherwise(i /= k /= j).
Concrete applications of Deﬁnitions 43 and 44 are found in Section 5. The next theorem states that
the program transformation yields all the paths in the original model that correspond to paths in
the updated model.
Theorem45 (Program transformation intoE–PDL).For all updatemodelsU and allE–PDL programs
, the following equivalence holds:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
To prove Theorem 45 we need two auxiliary results.
Lemma 46 (Constrained Kleene path). Suppose
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
Then (w, V ) ∈ [[KUijk (); ?pre(ej)]]M iff there is a  path from (w, ei) t (v, ej) in M ◦ U that does not
have intermediate states · · · −→(u, er) −→· · · with r ≥ k.
Proof. We use induction on k , following the deﬁnition of KUijk , distinguishing a number of cases.
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(a) Base case k = 0, subcase i = j: A  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) inM ◦ U that does not visit any
intermediate states is either empty or a single  step from (w, ei) to (v, ej). Such a path exists iff
((w, ei).(v, ej)) ∈ [[? ∪ ]]M◦U
iff (assumption) (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (? ∪ ); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (deﬁnitionT Uij ) (w, V ) ∈ [[?(pre(ei) ∧ [U, ei]) ∪ T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (i=j, (w, V ) ∈ [[? ∪ T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M
so pre(ei) = pre(ej))
iff (deﬁnition KUij0) (w, V ) ∈ [[KUij0(); ?pre(ej)]]M .
(b) Base case k = 0, subcase i /= j: A  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U that does not visit
any intermediate states is a single  step from (w, ei) to (v, ej). Such a path exists iff
((w, ei).(v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U
iff (assumption) (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (deﬁnition KUij0) (w, V ) ∈ [[KUij0(); ?pre(ej)]]M .
(c) Induction step. Assume that (w, V ) ∈ [[KUijk (); ?pre(ej]]M iff there is a  path from (w, ei) to
(v, ej) in M ◦ U that does not pass through any pairs (u, e) with e ∈ {ek , . . . , en−1}.
We have to show that (w, V ) ∈ [[KUij(k+1)(); ?pre(ej]]M iff there is a  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej)
in M ◦ U that does not pass through any pairs (u, e) with e ∈ {ek+1, . . . , en−1}.
Case i = k = j. A  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U that does not pass through any pairs
(u, e) with e ∈ {ek+1, . . . , en−1} now consists of an arbitrary composition of  paths from ek to
ek that do not visit any intermediate states with event component ek or higher. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, such a path exists iff (w, V ) ∈ [[(KUkkk())∗; ?pre(ej]]M iff (deﬁnition of KUij(k+1))
(w, V ) ∈ [[KUij(k+1)(); ?pre(ej]]M .
Case i = k /= j. A  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U that does pass through any pairs (u, e)
with e ∈ {ek+1, . . . , en−1} now consists of a  path starting in (w, ek) visiting states of the form
(u, ek) an arbitrary number of times, but never visiting states with event component ek or higher
in between, and ending in (v, ek), followed by a  path from (u, ek) to (v, ej) that does not visit any
pairs with event component e ∈ {ek , . . . , en−1}. By the induction hypothesis, a  path from (w, ek)
to (u, ek) of the ﬁrst kind exists iff (w, u) ∈ [[(KUkkk())∗; ?pre(ek)]]M . Again by the induction hypoth-
esis, a path from (u, ek) to (v, ej) of the second kind exists iff (u, V ) ∈ [[KUkjk; ?pre(ej)]]M . Thus, the
required path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U exists iff (w, V ) ∈ [[(KUkkk())∗;KUkjk(); ?pre(ej)]]M ,
which, by the deﬁnition of KUij(k+1), is the case iff (w, V ) ∈ [[KUij(k+1)(); ?pre(ej)]]M .
The other two cases are similar. 
Lemma 47 (General Kleene path). Suppose (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij ()); ?pre(ej)]]M iff there is a  step from
(w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U.
Then (w, V ) ∈ [[KUijn()); ?pre(ej)]]M iff there is a  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U.
Proof. Suppose (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M iff there is a  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U.
Then, assuming that U has states e0, . . . , en−1, an application of Lemma 46 yields that KUijn() is a
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program for all the  paths from (w, ei) to (v, ej) that can be traced through M ◦ U, for stopovers
at any (u, ek) with 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 are allowed. 
Lemma 47 explains the use of KUijn in the clause for 
∗ in Deﬁnition 43. Now, we can clinch
matters:
Proof. of Theorem 45. This time, we use induction on the structure of .
Base case a:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (a); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[?pre(ei); a; ?pre(ej)]]M and eiR(a)ej
iff M ,w |= pre(ei), (w, V ) ∈ [[a]]M , eiR(a)ej and M , v |= pre(ej)
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
Base case ?ϕ, subcase i = j:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (?ϕ); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[?(pre(ei) ∧ [U, ei]ϕ); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff w = v and M ,w |= pre(ei) and M ,w |= [U, ei]ϕ
iff w = v and M ,w |= pre(ei) and M ,w |= pre(ei) implies M ◦ U, (w, ei) |= ϕ
iff w = v and M ◦ U, (w, ei) |= ϕ
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[?ϕ]]M◦U.
Base case ?ϕ, subcase i /= j:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (?ϕ); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[?⊥]]M
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[?ϕ]]M◦U.
Induction step: Now consider any complex program  and assume for all components ′ of 
that:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (′); ?pre(ej)]]M iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[′]]M◦U
We have to show:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
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Here are the three relevant program operations:  = 1;2:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (1;2); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[⋃n−1k=0(T Uik (1); T Ukj (2)); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uik (1); T Ukj (2); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and some u ∈ W
(w, u) ∈ [[T Uik (1)]]M and (u, V ) ∈ [[T Ukj (2); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (ih) for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and some u ∈ W
(w, u) ∈ [[T Uik (1)]]M and ((u, ek), (v, ej)) ∈ [[2]]M◦U
iff for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and some u ∈ W
(w, u) ∈ [[T Uik (1)]]M , and
M , u |= pre(ek) and ((u, ek), (v, ej)) ∈ [[2]]M◦U
iff for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and some u ∈ W
(w, u) ∈ [[T Uik (1); pre(ek)]]M and ((u, ek), (v, ej)) ∈ [[2]]M◦U
iff (ih too) for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and some u ∈ W
((w, ei), (u, ek)) ∈ [[1]]M◦U and ((u, ek), (v, ej)) ∈ [[2]]M◦U
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
 = 1 ∪ 2:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (1 ∪ 2); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[(T Uij (1) ∪ T Uij (2)); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[(T Uij (1); ?pre(ej)) ∪ (T Uij (2)?pre(ej))]]M
iff (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (1); ?pre(ej)]]M or (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (2); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (ih) ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[1]]M◦U or ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[2]]M◦U
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U.
 = ∗:
(w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (∗); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (deﬁnition T Uij ) (w, V ) ∈ [[KUijn(); ?pre(ej)]]M
iff (ih, Lemma 47) there is a  path from (w, ei) to (v, ej) in M ◦ U
iff ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[∗]]M◦U. 
Theorem 48 (Reduction equivalence). Suppose that the model U has n states e0, . . . , en−1. Then:
M ,w |= [U, ei][]ϕ iff M ,w |=
n−1∧
j=0
[T Uij ()][U, ej]ϕ.
J. van Benthem et al. / Information and Computation 204 (2006) 1620–1662 1653
Proof. The result is derived by the following chain of equivalences:
M ,w |= [U, ei][]ϕ
iff M ,w |= pre(ei) implies M ◦ U, (w, ei) |= []ϕ
iff ∀v ∈ W , j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with ((w, ei), (v, ej)) ∈ [[]]M◦U,
M ◦ U, (v, ej) |= ϕ
iff (Thm 45) ∀v ∈ W , j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij (); ?pre(ej)]]M ,
M ◦ U, (v, ej) |= ϕ
iff ∀v ∈ W , j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij ()]]M ,
M , v |= pre(ej) implies M ◦ U, (v, ej) |= ϕ
iff ∀v ∈ W , j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with (w, V ) ∈ [[T Uij ()]]M ,
M , v |= [U, ej]ϕ
iff M ,w |=∧n−1j=0[T Uij ()][U, ej]ϕ 
What the Reduction Equivalence tells us is that LCC is equivalent to E–PDL, and hence, that a
proof system for LCC can be given in terms of axioms that reduce formulas of the form [U, e]ϕ to
equivalent formulas  with the property that their main operator is not an update modality for U.
First, we state the former model-theoretic expressiveness result, which is the ﬁrst main theorem of
this paper
Theorem 49 (‘LCC = E − PDL’). The languages of LCC and E − PDL have equal expressive power.
The earlier-mentioned similarity between ﬁnite automata and our current approach ismost strik-
ing in the deﬁnition of the transformation for starred programs. The deﬁnition of transformed ∗
paths in terms of operatorsKijk() resembles the deﬁnition of sets of regular languages Lk generated
by moving through a non-deterministic ﬁnite automaton without passing through states numbered
k or higher, in the well-known proof of Kleene’s Theorem. Textbook versions of its proof can be
found in many places, e.g., [19, Theorem 2.5.1].
Another, more technical, interpretation of Theorems 11, 12 is that they establish a strong clo-
sure property for propositional dynamic logic: not just under the usual syntactic relativizations to
submodels, but also under syntactic counterparts for much more general model transformations.
4.5. Reduction axioms and completeness for LCC
The results from the previous section point the way to appropriate reduction axioms for LCC.
In the axioms below psub(e) is sub(e)(p) if p is in the domain of sub(e), otherwise it is p .
Deﬁnition 50 (Proof system for LCC). The proof system for LCC consists of all axioms and rules of
PDL, plus the following reduction axioms:
[U, e] ↔ 
[U, e]p ↔ (pre(e) → psub(e))
[U, e]¬ϕ ↔ (pre(e) → ¬[U, e]ϕ)
[U, e](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)↔ ([U, e]ϕ1 ∧ [U, e]ϕ2)




[T Uij ()][U, ej]ϕ.
plus inference rules of necessitation for all update model modalities.
The last, and most crucial, of the reduction axioms in the given list is based on program trans-
formation. Incidentally, if slightly more general updates with so-called ‘multiple pointed update





As before with logics for public announcement, these reduction axioms also drive a translation
procedure. The results of Section 4.4 tell us that LCC is no more expressive than E − PDL; indeed,
program transformations provide the following translation:
Deﬁnition 51 (Translation). The function t takes a formula from the language of LCC and yields a




t(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = t(ϕ1) ∧ t(ϕ2)
t([]ϕ) = [r()]t(ϕ)
t([U, e]) = 
t([U, e]p) = t(pre(e)) → psub(e)
t([U, e]¬ϕ) = t(pre(e)) → ¬t([U, e]ϕ)
t([U, e](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = t([U, e]ϕ1) ∧ t([U, e]ϕ2)
t([U, ei][]ϕ =∧n−1j=0[T Uij (r())]t([U, ej]ϕ)




r(1;2) = r(1); r(2)
r(1 ∪ 2) = r(1) ∪ r(2)
r(∗) = (r())∗.
The correctness of this translation follows from direct semantic inspection, using the program
transformation corollary for the translation of [U, ei][]ϕ formulas. The clause for iterated update
modalities gives rise to exactly the same comments as those made for PAL–RC in Section 3.5.
As for deduction in our system, we note the following result:
Theorem 52 (Completeness for LCC). |= ϕ iff  ϕ.
Proof.The proof system for PDL is complete, and every formula in the language of LCC is provably
equivalent to a PDL formula. 
5. Analyzing major communication types
Our analysis of LCC has been abstract and general. But the program transformation approach
has a concrete pay-off! It provides a systematic perspective on communicative updates that occur in
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practice. For public announcement and common knowledge, it was still possible to ﬁnd appropriate
reduction axioms by hand. Such axioms can also be generated automatically, however, by program
transformation, aswewill now show. Thismethod then allows us to deal withmuchmore complicat-
ed cases, such as secret group communication and common belief, or subgroup announcement and
common knowledge, where axiom generation by hand is infeasible. For a border-line case, see [27]
for a direct axiomatization of the logic of subgroup communication with common knowledge—a
topic conspicuously absent from, e.g., [14]. Our analysis obviates the need for this laborious, and
error-prone, work.
The following generated axioms may look unwieldy, illustrating the fact that E–PDL functions
as an assembler language for detailed analysis of the higher level speciﬁcations of communicative
updates in terms of update models. But upon closer inspection, they make sense, and indeed, for
simple communicative scenarios, they can be seen to reduce to ELRC.
5.1. Public announcement and common knowledge
The update model for public announcement that ϕ consists of a single state e0 with precondition
ϕ and epistemic relation {(e0, e0)} for all agents. Call this model Pϕ.
We are interested how public announcement that ϕ affects common knowledge in a group of
agents B, i.e., we want to compute [Pϕ, e0][B∗] . For this, we need T Pϕ00 (B∗), which equalled K
Pϕ
001(B).
To work out K
Pϕ
001(B), we need K
Pϕ
000(B), and for K
Pϕ
000(B), we need T
Pϕ
00 (B), which turns out to be⋃
b∈B(?ϕ; b), or equivalently, ?ϕ;B. Working upwards from this, we get
K
Pϕ
000(B) =? ∪ T
Pϕ








= (? ∪ (?ϕ;B))∗
= (?ϕ;B)∗.
Thus, the reduction axiom for the public announcement update Pϕ with respect to the program for
common knowledge among agents B, works out as follows:
[Pϕ, e0][B∗] ↔ [T Pϕ00 (B∗)][Pϕ, e0] 
↔ [KPϕ001(B)][Pϕ, e0] 
↔ [(?ϕ;B)∗][Pϕ, e0] .
This expresses that every B path consisting of ϕ worlds ends in a [Pϕ, e0] world, i.e., it expresses
what is captured by the special purpose operator CB(ϕ, ) from Section 3.2.
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5.2. Secret group communication and common belief
The logic of secret group communication is the logic of email ‘cc’ (assuming that emails arrive
immediately and are read immediately). The update model for a secret group message to B that ϕ
consists of two possible events e0, e1, where e0 has precondition ϕ and e1 has precondition , and
where the accessibilities T are given by:
T = {e0R(b)e0 | b ∈ B} ∪ {e0R(a)e1 | a ∈ N \ B} ∪ {e1R(a)e1 | a ∈ N }.
The actual event is e0. The members of B are aware that ϕ gets communicated; the others think
that nothing happens. In this thought they are mistaken, which is why ‘cc’ updates generate KD45
models: i.e., ‘cc’ updates make knowledge degenerate into belief.
We work out the program transformations that this update engenders for common knowledge
among a group of agents D. Call the update model CCBϕ .







































(?ϕ; d) = ?ϕ; (D \ B)
T
CCBϕ
11 D = D
T
CCBϕ




000 D = ? ∪ (?ϕ; (B ∩ D))
K
CCBϕ
010 D = ?ϕ; (D \ B)
K
CCBϕ
110 D = ? ∪ D,
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K
CCBϕ
100 D = ?⊥.
From this we can work out the Kij1, as follows:
K
CCBϕ
001 D = (?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗
K
CCBϕ
011 D = (?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗; (D \ B)
K
CCBϕ
111 D = ? ∪ D
K
CCBϕ
101 D = ?⊥.
Finally, we get K002 and K012 from this:
K
CCBϕ
002 D = K
CCBϕ












001 D (since the right-hand expression evaluates to ?⊥)
= (?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗
K
CCBϕ
012 D = K
CCBϕ













= (?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗; (D \ B);D∗.
Thus, the program transformation for common belief among D works out as follows:
[CCBϕ , e0][D∗] 
↔
[(?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗][CCBϕ , e0] ∧ [(?ϕ; (B ∩ D))∗; (D \ B);D∗][CCBϕ , e1] .
This transformation yields a reduction axiom that shows that ELRC also sufﬁces to provide re-
duction axioms for secret group communication.
5.3. Group messages and common knowledge
Finally, we consider group messages. This example is one of the simplest cases that shows that
program transformations gives us reduction axioms that are no longer feasible to give by hand.
The update model for a group message to B that ϕ consists of two states e0, e1, where e0 has
precondition ϕ and e1 has precondition , and where the accessibilities T are given by:
T = {e0R(b)e0 | b ∈ B}∪
{e1R(b)e1 | b ∈ B}∪
{e0R(a)e1 | a ∈ N \ B}∪
{e1R(a)e0 | a ∈ N \ B}.
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This captures the fact that the members of B can distinguish the ϕ update from the  update, while
the other agents (the members of N \ B) cannot. The actual event is e0. Call this model GBϕ .
A difference with the ‘cc’ case is that group messages are S5 models. Since updates of S5 models
with S5 models are S5, group messages engender common knowledge (as opposed to mere com-
mon belief). Let us work out the program transformation that this update engenders for common
knowledge among a group of agents D.







































(?ϕ; d) =?ϕ; (D \ B),
T
GBϕ
11 D = D,
T
GBϕ




000D = ? ∪ (?ϕ;D),
K
GBϕ
010D = ?ϕ; (D \ B),
K
GBϕ
110D = ? ∪ D,
K
GBϕ
100D = D \ B.






011D = (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B,
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K
GBϕ
111 D = ? ∪ D ∪ (D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B),
K
GBϕ
101D = D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗.















(?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B; (D ∪ (D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B))∗ ;









= (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B; (D ∪ (D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B))∗.
AbbreviatingD ∪ (D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B) as , we get the following transformation for com-
mon knowledge among D after a group message to B that ϕ:
[GBϕ , e0][D∗] 
↔
[(?ϕ;D)∗ ∪ ((?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B;∗;D \ B; (?ϕ;D)∗)][GBϕ , e0] ∧
[(?ϕ;D)∗; ?ϕ;D \ B;∗][GBϕ , e1] .
This formula makes it clear that, although we can translate every formula of LCC to PDL, high-
er order descriptions using update models are more convenient for reasoning about information
change.
One interesting side-effect of this bunch of illustrations is that it demonstrates the computational
character of our analysis. Indeed, the above axioms were found by a machine! Cf. [9] on the use of
computational tools in exploring the universe of iterated epistemic updates.
6. Conclusion and further research
Dynamic-epistemic logics provide systematic means for studying exchange of factual and high-
er-order information. In this many-agent setting, common knowledge is an essential concept. We
have presented two extended languages for dynamic-epistemic logic that admit explicit reduction
axioms for common knowledge resulting from an update: one (PAL–RC) for public announcement
only, and one (LCC with its static base E–PDL) for general scenarios with information ﬂow. These
systems make proof and complexity analysis for informative actions more perspicuous than earlier
attempts in the literature. Still, PAL − RC and LCC are just two extremes on a spectrum, and many
further natural update logicsmay lie in between.We conclude by pointing out some further research
topics that arise on our analysis.
• Downward in expressive power from E–PDL. Which weaker language fragments are in ‘dynam-
ic-static harmony’, in the sense of having reduction axioms for compositional analysis of update
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effects, and the corresponding meaning-preserving translation? Our program transformer ap-
proach does work also with certain restrictions on tests in our full logic LCC, but we have not
yet been able to identify natural intermediate levels.
• Upward in expressive power from E–PDL. Which richer languages are in dynamic-static harmo-
ny? A typical candidate is the epistemic -calculus, which allows arbitrary operators for deﬁning
smallest and greatest ﬁxed-points. Indeed, we have a proof that the results of Section 3 extend
to the calculus PAL for public announcements, which takes the complete epistemic -calculus
for its static language (allowing no binding into announcement positions). Our conjecture is that
our expressivity and axiomatization results of Section 4 also extend to the full -calculus version
of LCC. Cf. [7] for a ﬁrst proposal.
• Other notions of group knowledge. Another test of our methodology via reduction axioms are
further notions of group knowledge. For instance, instead of common knowledge, consider dis-
tributed group knowledgeDBϕ consisting of those statements which are available implicitly to the
group, in the sense of ϕ being true at every world reachable from the current one by the inter-
section of all epistemic accessibility relations. The following simple reduction holds for public
announcements: [ϕ]DB ↔ (ϕ → DB[ϕ] ). We have not yet investigated our full system LCC
extended with distributed knowledge.
• Program constructions over update models. One can add the usual regular operations of compo-
sition, choice, and iteration over update models, to obtain a calculus describing effects of more
complex information-bearing events. It is known that this extension makes PAL undecidable, but
what about partial axiomatizations in our style? One can also look at such extensions as moving
toward a still richer epistemic temporal logic with future and past operators over universes of
ﬁnite sequences of events starting from some initial model. This would be more in line with the
frameworks of [13,25], to which our analysis might be generalized.
• Alternative questions about update reasoning. With one exception, our reduction axioms are all
schematically valid in the sense that substituting arbitrary formulas for proposition letters again
yields a valid formula. The exception is the base clause, which really only holds for atomic propo-
sition letters p . As discussed in [4], this means that certain schematically valid laws of update need
not be derivable from our axioms in an explicit schematic manner, even though all their concrete
instances will be by our completeness theorem. An example is the schematic law stating the asso-
ciativity of successive announcements. It is not known whether schematic validity is decidable,
even for PAL, and no complete axiomatization is known either. This is just one instance of open
problems concerning PAL and its ilk for public announcement (cf. the survey in [5]), which all
return for LCC, with our program transformations as a vehicle for generalizing the issues.
• Belief revision. Even though our language can describe agents’ beliefs, the product updatemecha-
nism does not describe genuine belief revision.New informationwhich contradicts current beliefs
just leads to inconsistent beliefs. There are recent systems, however, which handle belief revision
as update of plausibility rankings in models [6]. But so far, these systems only handle beliefs of
single agents. Our analysis of common belief might be added on top of these, to create a more
richly structured account of ‘group-based belief revision’.
• General logical perspectives. Languages with relativizations are very common in logic. Indeed,
closure under relativization is sometimes stated as a deﬁning condition on logics in abstract
model theory. Basic modal or ﬁrst-order logic as they stand are closed under relativizations [A]ϕ,
often written (ϕ)A. The same is true for logics with ﬁxed-point constructions, like PDL (cf. [3]) or
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the modal -calculus. E.g., computing a relativized least ﬁxed-point [A]p.ϕ(p) works much as
evaluation of p.ϕ(p) ∧ A – which actually suggests a corresponding dynamic epistemic reduc-
tion axiom (cf. [7]). The setting of Section 4 lifts relativization to some sort of ‘update closure’ for
general logical languages, referring to relative interpretations in deﬁnable submodels of products.
Languages with this property include again ﬁrst-order logic and its ﬁxed-point extensions, as
well as fragments of the -calculus, and temporal UNTIL logics.
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